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2Michael C. Keeley and Carl E. Walsh*
Summary of proceedings from the 1986 Fall Academic Conference
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco.
On November 20 and 21, 1986, the Federal
Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco held its annual Fall
Academic Conference. This conference provides a
forum for academic and business economists,
together with the staff economists of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, to discuss recent
academic research on topics ofcurrent policy inter-
est.
The 1986 conference focused on two topics. The
first, macroeconomic policy coordination, is atopic
thathas figured prominently inrecent discussions of
the United States' monetary policy. Frequently dur-
ing 1986, commentators linked the Federal
Reserve's setting ofthe discount rate to attempts to
coordinate interest rate cuts with Japan and West
Germany. The Reagan Administration also
expressed a desire to coordinate U.S. monetary and
fiscal policy with more expansionary policies in
Japan and W. Germany as a means ofreducing the
U.S. trade deficit. Two papers and a panel discus-
sion during the first day ofthe conference examined
various aspects ofinternational policy coordination.
A third paperexamined domestic policy interaction
between independent monetary and fiscal
authorities.
Financial intermediaries and their role in the
economy comprised the second topic discussed at
the conference. The course of financial innovation
andderegulationoverthe lastdecadeinthe U.S. has
brought to prominence several important policy
issues related to banking regulation and the respon-
sibility of the Federal Reserve to maintain the sta-
bility ofthe financial system. Five papers presented
at the conference addressed issues related to the role
offinancial intermediaries in the economy, specifi-
cally those important to the debate over the appro-
priate scope ofand need for financial regulation and
ways ofreforming our current regulatory system.
This article contains a briefsurvey ofthe papers
presented at the 1986 Fall Academic Conference
with an emphasis on their policy implications.
Copies of any of the individual papers may be
requested by writing toPublic Information, Federal
Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, 101 Market Street,
San Francisco, California 94105.
I. Policy Coordination
Recent developments in the analysis of mac-
roeconomic policy have emphasized the role played
by expectations about future policy actions. In par-
ticular, the impactofcurrentpolicy on the economy
can be influenced by the private sector's expecta-
tions about future policy. The influence ofexpecta-
tions raises two issues: first, whether we can under-
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standtheeffects ofcurrenteconomic policy without
an explicit understanding ofhow policy is likely to
bedeterminedin the future; second, whetherpolicy-
makers can influence the economy by announcing
that they will take certain actions in the future.
These issues are particularly important when try-
ing to understand economic policy in the presence
of two or more independent policy authorities.
Recent concern in two areas highlight the timely
relevance of research on the interactions among
policy authorities. In this nation, where authority
for fiscal and monetary policy resides in separate
institutions, some authors have expressed concernover the extent to which the Federal Reserve might
be forced by fiscal inaction to monetize the growing
federal debt. On the international scene, where
policy decisions taken by one country can affect the
policy choices open to othercountries, much atten-
tion has been placed on recent attempts by the U.S.
to reduce the American trade deficit by persuading
Japan and W. Germany to stimulate their econo-
mies.
Money, Deficit and Public Debt:
An Empirical Investigation
by Guido Tabellini and Vincenzo La Via
The paper by Guido Tabellini of UCLA and
Vincenzo La Via of the World Bank entitled
"Money, Deficit and Public Debt: An Empirical
Investigation" focuses on the joint behavior of
domestic monetary and fiscal authorities. Recent
theoretical work has emphasized that the relation-
ship between macroeconomic variables, suchas real
interest rates and the current budget deficit, will
depend critically on the expectations the public
holds about the course of future budget deficits.
These expectations will, in tum, depend on future
monetary and fiscal policy. Therefore, to analyze the
impact ofcurrent and projected federal budget defi-
cits, for example, it would be necessary to forecast
how the Federal Reserve and theCongress are likely
to act in the future. Specifically, will the Federal
Reserve eventually generate renewed inflation by
monetizing future deficits, or will Congress be
forced eventually to raise taxes to reduce the debt?
To forecast future monetary and fiscal policy, it is
necessary to understand how relatively independent
policy authorities will interact. Such interaction
may be particularly complex when, as seems likely,
thepolicy authorities have conflicting objectives. In
such an environment, Tabellini and La Via take the
view that "future policies must be viewed as the
equilibrium outcome of a dynamic game between
the two authorities."
The game that the authors model separates the
strategic interaction of the monetary and fiscal
authorities into two stages. In the first stage, each
authority chooses an optimal path for the policy
instrument under its control in order to achieve its
macroeconomic objectives without considering the
choices being made by the other authority. The
policy instruments in the United States consist of
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the monetary base for the central bank and the
cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit net of interest for
tile fiscal authority. In the second stage, each policy
authority attempts to achieve the best trade-off
between keeping its policy instrument close to the
value that achieves its macroeconomic objectives
anci minimizing deviations of the stock of public
debt from a desired target.
The second stageofthis game is made interesting
by the dynamic government budget constraint that
links the debt to the actions of the monetary and
fiscal authorities. The fiscal policymaker can lower
the debt held by the public by choosing to run a
budget surplus, but this course of action may con-
flict with the fiscal stance necessary to achieve the
reference path. The monetary authority can reduce
the debt held by the public bymonetizing it, butthis
choice may conflict with the path of the monetary
base necessary to achieve goals such as price sta-
bility.
The solutionto this game yields a set ofequations
that describe the behavior ofthe monetary base, the
noncyclical fiscal deficit, and the stock ofdebt held
by thepublic. The heartofthe authors' theory lies in
the restrictions the theory implies for the coeffi-
cients in the equations for the base, the deficit, and
the debt. Most importantly, these coefficients
depend on the parameters characterizing the weight
each policymaker gives to achieving its desired
value for the debt.
If the fiscal authority cares about achieving its
target for debt, while the monetary authority does
not, then the monetary authority will set its instru-
ment to achieve its macroeconomic objective with-
outregardtothe debt and the fiscal authority will be
forced to give up its desired reference path in order
to keep the total debt near the desired target. Con-
versely, if the monetary authority cares about the
debt target and the fiscal authority does not, the
monetary authority will be forced to sacrifice such
macro goals as low inflation, for example, in order
to achieve the target level of the debt. These two
alternative outcomes represent the extremes in
which onepolicymakeror the otherdominates. The
actual outcome will depend on the relative weight
each authority places on its policy objectives.
A chiefpurpose ofthe Tabellini and La Via paper
is to provide a framework for empirical analysis that
might allow these weights to be estimated. Theframework would· then allow a conclusion to be
drawn as to whether U.S. policy is best charac-
terized as a game in which the monetary authority
dominates or one in which the fiscal authority
dominates.
Themainfinding ofthepaperis thatthe burdenof
stabilizing public debt during the period 1955-1985
fell onthe fiscal authority. The authors concludethat
"there is no evidence ofdebt monetization on the
partofthemonetary authorities, while instead there
is strong evidence that fiscal deficits were reduced
whenthestockofpublicdebtinheritedfrom thepast
increased." In other words, the evidence suggests
that the Federal Reserve has not, in the past, tended
to monetize government debt. Other findings are
that both fiscal andmonetary policy tend to be more
expansionary under Democratic administrations,
and that there is evidence of a political business
cycle in both monetary and fiscal policy related to
national elections.
Comments by Steve Sheffrin
Steve Sheffrin of the University of California at
Davis raised three issues in his comments on the
Tabellini and La Via paper. First, he questioned the
divisionofthepolicy game intotwo separate stages.
In particular, he felt that it seems unreasonable to
expectpolicy authorities to act in the first stage as if
they were totally unaware ofthe second stage ofthe
game. Tabellini agreed that this separation was
somewhat artificial, but argued that it allowed the
analysis to be greatly simplified.
Second, Sheffrinexpressedconcern abouttheuse
of the cyclically adjusted federal budget deficit as
the fiscal policy instrument. He claimed the use of
the deficit ignores the choice between spending
changes and tax changes.! In addition, the use ofa
cyclically adjusted deficit was not introduced into
macroeconomic policy discussions until the 1960s
so he believed that its use in the empirical work as a
measure ofthe fiscal policy instrumentfor the entire
1955-1983 period may be inappropriate.
Finally, Sheffrin questioned whether Tabellini
and La Via had really succeeded in estimating
structural parameters that can be used as guides to
understanding future policy. In particular, he
referred to parameters estimatedby Tabellini and La
Via which they describe as representing the prefer-
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ences of·the monetary and fiscal authorities. To
Sheffrin, it seemed unlikely that such preference
parameters would remain unchanged as the person-
alities of the individuals determining policy
changed. TabeUini noted that an attempt was made
to. test for parameter stability over the sample
period, and that dummy variables were included in
the empirical analysis to capture the effects of
changesinthe chairmanshipofthe FederalReserve.
The results suggested monetary policy was most
restrictive under William Martin's chairmanship.
Noncooperative Monetary Policies
in Interdependent Economies
by Matthew Canzoneri and Dale Henderson
Tabellini and La Via examine only the Nash
equilibrium to their dynamic policy game; they do
not consider how the outcomes might be affected if
the monetary and fiscal authorities can coordinate
their policies or build reputations for "good"
behavior. The role ofsuch reputation building is one
ofthe central foci ofthe Conference's second paper,
"Noncooperative Monetary Policies in Interdepen-
dent Economies: Time Inconsistency and Reputa-
tion" by Matthew Canzoneri and Dale Henderson,
both of Georgetown University. The paper repre-
sents achapterfrom the authors' forthcoming book,
Noncooperative Monetary Policies in Interdepen-
dent Countries.
Like Tabellini and La Via, Canzoneri and Hen-
derson employa game-theoretic framework to study
the interaction of two policy authorities. However,
Canzoneri and Henderson shift the focus from the
domestic interaction of monetary and fiscal
authorities to the international context in which the
different policymakers are the monetary authorities
in different countries. The authors argue that one
can obtain misleading conclusions from models
with only one active policy authority and illustrate
their argument with an example. In their example, a
requirement that policy be pre-committed to certain
actions necessarily leads to better outcomes when
only one policymaker is active but may lead to
worse outcomes when two policymakers are active.
Canzoneri and Henderson note that ifthe current
behaviorofprivate agents dependsontheirexpecta-
tions of the future, credible announcements about
future policy instrument settings may provide pol-icy authorities with an extrainstrumentfor affecting
the currentvalues oftheirtarget variables. Thus, the
ability to pre-commit to future actions increases the
number ofeffective policy instruments available to
policymakers. The authors examine the role ofpre-
commitment within the context of a two-country
model in which monetary policies in the two coun-
tries can be either cooperative or noncooperative.
As a framework for theiranalysis, the authors use
a model in which each monetary authority cares
about employment and price volatility in its own
country. The price the authority cares about,
however, corresponds to the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) - an average ofthe price ofhome goods and
the home priceofforeign goods- which is affected
by monetary policy actions in the other country
through the real exchange rate.
For example, a rise in the home country's money
supply raises the price of home output and further
raises the home CPI by causing the home country
currency to depreciate in real terms. This deprecia-
tion comes about because an increase in the home
money supplylowers real wages, given that nominal
wages are predetermined by contracts, thereby
causing home output to rise and creating an excess
supplyofdomestic output. The home currency must
depreciate in real terms to raise demand for domes-
tic output and restore equilibrium in the market for
home output. Whileadomestic monetaryexpansion
raises the home CPI, the associated real deprecia-
tion ofthe home currency lowers the foreign CPI.
In the Canzoneri and Henderson model, credible
announcements about future monetary policies
affect currentCPls because they affectexpectedreal
exchange rates. This connection depends critically
on the assumption that wage contracts last for more
than one period.2 The existence of multi-period
wage contracts imparts a short-run rigidity to wages
that allows announced monetary policy actions to
have real effects.
Canzoneri and Henderson then show how pre-
committingto future policyactions in the absenceof
cooperation among policymakers can be undesir-
able. They cite the case ofa symmetric disturbance
in which each policymaker will consider respond-
ing with the two tools available: the current money
supply and a commitment for next period's money
supply. SinceCanzoneri and Henderson assume that
34
the monetary policymakers inthe two countries also
respond symmetrically, their commitments to
change next period's money supplies are coun-
terproductive. Their symmetric pre-commitments
have no effectonthisperiod'semploymentandCPls
because.the pre-commitments leave the expected
real exchange rate unchanged. The only effects of
thepre-commitments areundesirablechanges in the
next period's CPls. According to this model, each
policymaker makes a counterproductive commit-
ment to changenext period's money supply because
ifhe did not, the other policymaker would make a
commitment that would leave him in an even worse
position.
In his presentation at the Conference, Henderson
developed a four-way classification of policy
according to whethercooperative ornoncooperative
behavior and pre-commitment or no pre-commit-
ment are involved. He then argued that two com-
binations - noncooperative behavior with no pre-
commitment and cooperative behavior with pre-
commitment - were the most relevant options for
future study. In most cases, cooperation among
policyauthorities, togetherwith pre-commitmentto
future policy, is likely to yield the best results since,
as Richard Sweeney of Claremont McKenna Col-
lege, the paper's discussant, pointed out, coopera-
tion maximizes the economic pie and pre-commit-
ment maximizes the number of instruments
available to the policy authorities.
Canzoneri and Henderson also consider what
happens when the policymakers interact in an
infinite sequence oftwo-period games. In this situa-
tion, the policymakers can establish reputations for
good behavior. Over an infinite succession of two-
period games, noncooperative behavior without
pre-commitment may result in what can usefully be
called the efficient outcome, that is, the outcome
that would result with cooperative behaviorand pre-
commitment in a single two-period game. The inef-
ficient outcome is the outcome that would result
with noncooperative behavior and no pre-commit-
ment in a single two-period game.
In playing the succession ofgames, each policy-
maker thinks that if he does not cheat, the other
policymaker will continue to choose the policy
associated with the efficient outcome, and that ifhe
does cheat, the other policymaker will revert to thepolicy associated with the inefficient outcome for
some number of two-period games in the future,
perhaps forever. Each policymaker would choose
the policy associated with the efficient· outcome
only ifthe future reward for not cheating were high
enough. The Canzoneri and Henderson analysis
suggests that when reputation building is possible,
the outcomes of noncooperative behavior without
pre-commitment may not be inefficient.
Comments by Richard Sweeney
In discussing Canzoneri and Henderson's paper,
Richard Sweeney felt that actual experience with
policy coordination suggests that policy authorities
have usually tried to get other countries to follow
bad policies. In addition, policy authorities may
have preferences that differ from those of private
agents - a point of view emphasized in recent
theories ofpublic choice.
An Econometric Evaluation of
International Monetary Policy Rules
by John Taylor
Whereas the Henderson and Canzoneri paper
provided a theoretical framework for analyzing pol-
icy coordination, the purpose of the conference's
third paper, "An Econometric Evaluation of Inter-
national Monetary Policy Rules: Fixed versus Flex-
ible Exchange Rates" by John Taylor of Stanford
University, was to report on a model designed to
evaluatealternativepolicyregimes empirically. This
paperrepresents part ofan ongoing research project
by Taylor that involves the estimation ofa rational
expectations model ofseven industrial countries-
the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan
and the United Kingdom. Taylor strongly argued
thateven ifagreement were reached on the theoreti-
cal effects ofdisturbances inopen economies, esti-
mates ofthe empirical magnitudes involved would
remain crucial for actual policy analysis.
Taylor attempts in his paper "to evaluate and
compareflexible versus fixedexchange rate systems
using arational expectations policy evaluation tech-
nique..." The estimated multi-country model he
uses is subjected to random shocks, first under the
assumption of flexible exchange rates and then
under the assumption of fixed exchange rates. He
then evaluates the two different exchangerate sys-
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tems· by comparing the fluctuations in output,
prices, imports, and exports undereach system. His
results seem to indicate that economic fluctuations
would be smaller under a flexible exchange rate
system.
Taylor's evaluation of the exchange rate regime
focuses only on aggregate supply disturbances. At
this stage of the research project, Taylor has not
fUlly evaluatedthe two exchangerate systems inthe
face of aggregate spending and financial market
disturbances. Also, he makes very specific assump-
tionsabout monetary policy and fiscal policy to
compare fixed and flexible exchange rates. Under
bothsystems, heholds fiscal policyconstant. Under
the flexible rate system, he assumes that all seven
countries in the model hold constant the rate of
growth oftheir money supplies. In contrast, under
the fixed rate system, he assumes that the U.S.
holds its money growthrateconstantwhile the other
six countries allow whatever money supply move-
ments are necessary to keep their exchange rates
fixed.
Taylor compares these alternative exchange rate
systems using a model characterized by two impor-
tant features. First, the aggregate wage level is
modelled as determined by the existence of multi-
period, overlapping contracts ofthe type studied by
Taylor in earlier work. 3 The wage equations are
estimated for the United States, and the wage equa-
tions inthe other six countries are then assumed to
be the same as that for the U.S. Second, the model
assumes perfect capital mobility as reflected in its
requirement that deviation from uncovered interest
parity be zero on average. This requirement means
that the differential between interest rates in each
country must equal the expected change in the
exchange rate. In Taylor's model, therefore, this
interestrate parityconditionandthe wage equations
are two channels through which expectations ofthe
futureinfluence the economy's currentequilibrium.
The presence ofexpectations offuture variables,
togetherwiththeassumption thatthese expectations
are rational, greatly complicates the derivation of
the policy simulations. Within Taylor's model, the
solution for the current period depends on expecta-
tions of next period's equilibrium, which depends
on· expectations of the following period's equi-
librium, andsoon. Hence, tosimulatethe modelforeven one quarter requires that the model be solved
into the distantfuture to ensure that the expectations
of the future are consistent with the actual future
behavior implied by the model.
In addition to providing a comparison ofalterna-
tive exchange rate regimes in the face of supply
shocks, Taylor's paper also reports the estimated
effects of unanticipated U.S. monetary and fiscal
policy changes. He examines the effects of these
policy changes under both fixed and flexible
exchange rates.
Under flexible exchange rates, Taylor shows that
a U.S. monetary expansion raises U.S. real output
during the first year of the expansion; output then
returns to its baseline level over the next two years,
reflecting the long-run neutrality of money. The
dollar depreciates in response to the monetary
expansion in this simulation, but the effects ofU.S.
monetary expansion on other countries are small.
The rise in domestic output raises U.S. demand for
imports, which causes some output expansion in
the other countries, but this foreign expansion is
dampened by the dollar depreciation that shifts
demand to U.S. output.
According to Taylor, when a fixed exchange rate
regime is in operation, a similar U.S. monetary
expansion produces a large expansion in the other
countries. In contrast to the flexible exchange rate
case, the other countries must keep their currencies
from appreciating relative to the dollar under fixed
exchange rates. To do so they must let their money
supplies expand. These induced monetary expan-
sions lead to the greater output effects Taylor finds
with fixed rates.
Taylor finds a similar contrast in the effects of a
U.S. fiscal expansion under fixed and flexible
exchange rates. Under flexible exchange rates, he
finds that an increase in U.S. government expendi-
tures produces a dollar appreciation and a trade
deficitfor the U.S. thatleadsto some real expansion
in the other countries in the short-run. In contrast,
under a fixed exchange rate system, he finds that a
U.S. fiscal expansion leads to a sharp contraction
abroad as the other countries are forced to reduce
their money growth to keep exchange rates from
changing. While these results agree qualitatively
with standard open economy theoretical models,
Taylor's research yieldsestimatesofthe quantitative
magnitudes involved.
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Comments by Roger Craine
Roger Craine from the University of California,
Berkeley, was the discussant of Taylor's paper.
Craine applauded Taylor's approach to policy eval-
uation in which the behavior of a model represent-
ingan economy orpolicy regime is studied while it
is disturbed by random shocks.
Craine did, however, question whether the
parameters of Taylor's model would remain
unaffected by a shift in the exchange rate regime. In
his empiricalwork, Taylordoes accountfor changes
in the way expectations of the future are formed
when the exchange rate regime shifts, but other
aspects ofthe model, such as the average length of
wage contracts, are assumed to remain unchanged.
One method for testing the stability ofthe model
over exchange rate regime shifts was suggested by
Craine. Sincethe model was estimatedoveraperiod
offlexible exchange rates with data from the period
1971 to 1985 used in the estimation, Craine noted it
should be possible to use the model to "forecast"
backward. Onecould then seeifthe model is able to
fit the period offixed exchange rates prior to 1971 .
First Day Panel Discussion
The first day ofthe Conference concluded with a
panel discussion on policy coordination. Panel
members were Peter B. Clark, Acting Division
Chief of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Professor Robert W. Clower of the University of
South Carolina, H. Robert Heller, member of the
Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve System,
and Professor Thomas Willett ofClaremont Gradu-
ate School.
PeterClark beganthe discussion by reviewing the
role played by the IMF in international policy coor-
dination. Heexplained that the role is played at two
levels. First, at the bilateral level, the IMF focuses
on the policies ofone country in relation to the rest
ofthe world. Since most countries are "small", the
focus atthis level is on the impactofexternal factors
on the country's domestic economy. For "large"
countries such as the U.S., IMF discussions focus
on the impact of that country's domestic policy on
the rest of the world. Clark cites discussions with
U.S. policymakers over the impact offiscal deficits
on world interest rates as an example of the diffi-
culties inherent in policy coordination when policy-makers hold different views about the true workings
ofthe world economy.
Second, at the global level, the IMF focuses on
multilateral coordination of policy and provides a
forum through which countries can exchange infor-
mation on economic forecasts and policy assump-
tions. Clark's example ofan issue addressed at this
multilateral level was the problem of managing
world aggregate demand in the face of declining
world fiscal deficits.
RobertCloweremphasizedthat, in the absence of
a better understanding of how economies work at
the macro level, discussions of policy coordination
are of little value. Such coordination requires fore-
casts ofwhere economies are headed, but he stated
thateconomists are simply not capable ofproviding
believable forecasting models ofreal economies. In
this situation, Clower believes, policies are usually
based on "faith, hope, and bias."
Clower also argued that there is little short-run
connection between demand, supply, and price in
most markets. He felt that economists need to
understand better how markets work before they
worry about policy coordination.
In his remarks, Robert Heller praised the line of
research presented in John Taylor's paper for its
attempt to quantify some of the issues that are
relevant for an evaluation of policy coordination.
Heller drew a contrast between automatic regimes,
such as the gold standard, and discretionary re-
gimes, such as that which currently characterizes
the international economy. He said that coordina-
tion was determined by rules in automatic regimes,
and described discretionary regimes as charac-
terized by "coordination by conference."
Heller argued that the desirability of flexible
exchange rates will depend on the cost ofreallocat-
ing resources within each country. He believed that
smallcountries would tend to favor afixed exchange
rate system because rate adjustments are likely to be
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expensivefor them. In contrast, he thought the large
industrial economies would favor flexible exchange
rates. Hellerargued that a hierarchy ofviews exists.
Among the U.S., Japan and Germany, for example,
coordination may rely primarily on flexible
exchange rates. Among Germany, France, and the
U.K., greater reliance may be placed on fixed
exchange rates withinEuropeandflexible rate.s with
therestoftheworld. In tum, eachofthese countries
is likely to have a group of smaller nations, often
formercolonies, thatfix theirexchangerates against
the larger country's currency.
Tom Willett emphasized that the disagreement
among policymakers over the correct model of the
world economy has played a major role in limiting
past attempts to coordinate policy. He cited the
recent revival ofthe locomotive argument, in which
the U.S. wants Japan and W. Germany to expand
more rapidly and thereby pull up the U.S. growth
rate. Willett believed that one's view of the desir-
ability and even effectiveness ofsuch coordination
depends on whether a Keynesian or monetarist
model provides the more accurate view ofeconomic
movements.
Willett felt that the post-war record of avoiding
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies was fairly good.
However, he also felt that recent discussions on
coordinating policy to reduce exchangerate fluctua-
tions have been misdirected. He believes that
exchange rate stability, by itself, is not an appropri-
ate objective ofpolicy. International considerations
can be important for monetary and fiscal policy
formulations, but Willett stated the objective of
policy coordination should be to promote overall
economic stability and that this objective does not
always correspond to a constant exchange rate.
When macroeconomic policies themselves contrib-
ute to economic instability, he suggested that
attempts to peg exchange rates within target zones
may promote further instability.II. Financial Intermediaries and the Economy
Many policymakers believe that financial inter-
mediaries (that is, banks and thrifts) playa central
and·special role in the macroeconomy that is dif-
ferent from that played by other firms. This belief
underlies the notion that maintaining the stabilityof
financial intermediaries is key to ensuring a stable
real sector and avoiding the economic downturns
frequently associated with financial panics caused
by bank failures. However, there has been a long-
standing debate in the academic economics litera-
tureaboutjustwhat it is that differentiates financial
intermediaries from other firms, or even ifthey are
different.
Some economists argue that banks' role in the
macroeconomy is not inherently different from
other firms even though banks undoubtedly provide
valuable services. Proponents of this view believe
that banking regulation is unnecessary and that an
unregulated banking industry would be stable. To
the extent banks currently have a special role,
adherents ofthis view believe that this special role is
a result ofregulation, not a reason for regulation.
Others argue that banks are "special" because of
externalities involved in the provision of payment
and/or credit intermediation services. As a result,
banking regulation is necessary to ensure the sta-
bility ofthe banking industry and the real economy.
At a minimum, proponents of this view argue that
some sort of federal protection is needed - in the
form ofeither explicit or implicit deposit insurance
- to prevent a systemic collapse ofbanking. Once
such a guarantee is in place, they note that other
sorts of regulations are needed to keep bank risk-
taking in check.
Amore complete understanding ofthe economic
roles of banks and the influence of banks on the
macroeconomy might have far-reaching implica-
tions for the regulation ofthe financial system and
might well contribute to our understanding of the
causes and effects of business cycles. Moreover,
such understanding might have important implica-
tions for monetary policy.
The papers presented during the second session
of the Conference contribute to our knowledge of
these issues by analyzing the economic functions of
banks (depository institutions), the relationship
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between banks and the macroeconomy, and the role
ofbankingregulation.
CflallengesinDeposit Insurance Reform
A Speech byRobert Parry
lrrapresentation entitled, "Challenges in
DepositInsuranceReform," RobertParry, President
of. the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco,
addressed one of the more pressing issues in bank
regulation:refoffil ofthe deposit insurance system.
He focused on how deposit insurance could be
reformedinsucha way as to eliminatethe incentives
it currently provides for excessive risk-taking while
still preserving the ability of deposit insurance to
prevent bank runs.
His topic is especially important in light of the
rapid pace of financial innovation in recent years.
Currently, bank regulation and supervision are the
primary means used to keep bank risk-taking in
check. Such oversight is needed because a virtual
100 percent deposit insurance guarantee essentially
eliminates depositorsurveillance- the mechanism
through which market forces would restrict risk-
taking in an unregUlated environment. (In an unreg-
ulated environment, banks with more risky port-
folios would have to pay higher interest rates on
deposits.)
Ifbanks were allowed to participate in the chang-
ing financial environment, it would be necessary to
reduce restrictive regulation and maximize reliance
on market incentives to keep risk-taking in check.
The question then is whether it is possible to
increase reliance onprivate market forces while still
maintaining depositor protection to prevent bank
runs.
Although Parry did not directly address the
broader question of whether the banking industry
wouldbe stable in the absence ofdeposit insurance,
he argued that there are ways of keeping the good
features ofdeposit insurance- its ability to prevent
runs while at the same time minimizing the
incentives it provides for excessive risk-taking. In
particular, he argued for protecting the deposit
insurance funds by shifting all of the risk of bank
losses to bank equity holders.
He pointed out that although other approaches,such as shifting risk to depositors, would increase
marketdiscipline, theywould notprovideprotection
against bank runs. In contrast, shifting risk to bank
capitalholders wouldsimultaneouslyprotectdepos-
itors and the insurance fund while eliminatingthe
incentives for excessive risk-taking inherent in our
current system.
To protect the. insurance fund by ..!jhifting risk to
capitalholders, Parry proposed using market value
accounting and closing banks befOre their market
value could fall below zero when closure would
result in losses to the insurance fund. He notedthat
such a policy might not be easyto implement, but
thatthe costsofcarryingitoutwould belessthanthe
losses to thedepositinsurancefunds ofnotdoing so.
Moreover, failure to reform deposit insurance might
result either in an expansion ofthe scope of insur-
ance and the scope of regulation if banks were
allowed to expand into new areas, or such severe
bank regulations.that many traditional banking
functions would be undertaken outside the banking
industry.
Discussion
The general discussion following Parry's speech
focused mainly on the issue of whether deposit
insurance was necessary - the implication being
that ifit were not needed, the easiest way to reform
deposit insurance would be to eliminate it.
However, there was little disagreement that if
deposit protection were necessary, then some type
ofreform ofdeposit insurance is required.
Discussionthenturnedtothe lender-of-last-resort
function of the Federal Reserve as a potential
replacement for deposit insurance. Some discus-
sants pointed out that if the lender-of-Iast-resort
function were used to prevent runs at failing (or
failed) banks, the function would have the exact
same incentives for excessive risk-taking as our
current deposit insurance system. The lender-of-
last-resort function would in effect maintain the
federal guarantee of deposits and the undesirable
incentives of deposit insurance for excessive risk-
taking.
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Some Evidence onthe Uniqueness
ofBank loans
by ChrisJames
.Although the discussion did notresolve theques-
tion ofwhetherthere is an inherent need for deposit
insurance, a conference paperby Chris James ofthe
University of Oregon shed additional light on one
aspectofthe issue: whetherbank loans are special.
James'paper, entitled "Some Evidence on the
Uniqueness of Bank Loans," dealt with the ques-
tionsofwhether banks loans are somehow special
and different from other types of credit. That is,
whether bank loans are imperfect substitutes for
other types ofloans, such as public debt offerings.
The answer to this question has two important
policy implications. First, if the credit intermedia-
tion services ofbanks were special, regulatory pol-
icies, suchas 100percentreserve requirements, that
restrict the degree of bank-provided credit inter-
mediation could be expected to have adverse con-
sequences for the real economy. Second, if bank
loans were special, a regulatory policy that ensured
a stable provision ofbank credit could have benefi-
cial real economic effects.
In addition, monetary policy might have real
effects even in a classical general equilibrium
framework ifbank loans were special. Forexample,
ifrestrictive monetary policy reduced the degree of
bank-provided financial·intermediation, real eco-
nomic. activity as well as prices would decline.
Thus, the James paperis ofpotential importance for
both.regulatory policy and monetary policy.
James examinestwo typesofevidence supporting
the uniqueness ofbank loans. First, he analyzes the
incidence of the reserve tax on bank certificates of
deposit(CDs) to determine whetherbankborrowers
orban!< depositors bear the reserve tax on CDs.
Second, hecomparesthe stock-price announcement
effects of new bank credit with those of private
placements and public straight debt offerings for a
group ofpUblicly traded banks.
James finds noevidencethat bankdepositors bear
the reservetax on CDs. First, James finds that CD
rates do notdiffer significantly from otherdomestic
openmarket rates with similar maturities. Second,
whenthe reservetaxwas increasedbetweenNovem-
ber 1978 and July 1980, there was no statistically
significantdecrease inthe rate onCDsrelative totherate oncommercial paperorTreasury bills as might
be expected ifdeposit holders bore the reserve tax.
These findings would seem to be compelling
evidence that depositors do not bear the reserve tax
andthatCDdeposits are perfectsubstitutesfor other
types of open-market instruments. More impor-
tandy, ifthe banking sector were competitive, these
findings imply that bank borrowers must bear the
reserve tax in the form of higher loan rates. Ifso,
bank loans would be special in the sense that bor-
rowers are willing to pay higher rates for them.
James also finds evidence supporting the unique-
ness ofbankloans in acomparisonofthe stockprice
responses ofborrowing firms to the announcements
ofnew bank loan agreements, private placements of
debt (primarily with insurance companies), and
public straight debt offerings.
James argues that bank loans might be special
because they convey information to the market
about the soundness ofthe borrowing firm. That is,
the bank may have information about the firm that
outside investors do not.4 If so, one might expect
announcements ofbank loans to be associated with
positive stock price effects while public debt offer-
ings or private placements of debt would have no
such effect.
As expected, James finds a positive stock-price
response associated with the announcement of a
bank loan that is larger than the stock-price
responses observed for private placements and pub-
lic straight debt offerings. In addition, the larger
stock-price response associated with bank loan
announcements does not appearto be attributable to
any characteristic ofthe debt contract such as matu-
rity, size of the loan, or differences in the type of
borrower using each type ofborrowing agreement.
James concludes that the stock-price evidence
together with the incidence of the reserve tax on
bank borrowers suggests that there must be some-
thing special or unique about bank loans. An
implication of this view is that bank loans may
provide a mechanism for reducing monitoring costs
and agency costs and avoiding information asym-
metries and the underinvestment problem associ-
ated with such asymmetries. Unfortunately, James'
results offer no completely satisfactory explanation




David· Pyle of the University of California at
Berkeley raised the following issues in his discus-
Sioflof.the·James paper. First,.he ••questionectthe
reliabilityofthe eviden~eregarding the incidenceof
the reserve tax on CDs. He thought that pooling the
data over a long period, as James did, might have
problemsbecauseofchanges ininterestratespreads
that ••might ·have occurred because of factors. not
related to thereserve tax. Hearguedthat, onstatisti-
cal grounds, using shorter·observation periods
around the times ofthe actual changes in the reserve
tax would be superior to pooling the data overthe
longer period.
Moreover, even ifthe findings ofno change in the
interest-rate spread held up, Pyle questioned
whether one could conclude, as James does, that
bank borrowers necessarily bearthe reserve tax. For
example, it is possible that bank owners might bear
the tax ifbanking were not competitive - perhaps
because of regulatory restrictions and subsidies.
Because ofthis possibility, Pyle suggested examin-
ing the effects ofthe reserve tax on bank net worth
by analyzing the stock-price responses when
changes in the reserve requirements on CDs were
announced.
Second, Pyle was highly supportive of James'
analysis ofthe effects ofdifferent types offinancing
on stock price returns. He noted that James' finding
thatissues of straight debt used to refinance bank
loans had a statistically significant negative effect
on stock prices was strikingly different from pre-
vious findings by other researchers. The new find-
ing provides a basis for arguing, as James does, that
the inability of other researchers to find such an
effect was due to their inability to discriminate
among different uses ofdebt.
Pyle also asked whetherthe loanapproval process
itself (which presumably conveys information) or
the actual takedown ofloans accounts for the posi-
tive stock-price effect, and urged James to pursue
this.line ofresearch further.Explaining the Demand for
Free Bank Notes
by ArthurRolnick and Warren Weber
Although the James paper suggests that bank
credit is special, it leaves open the question of
whether banks' payment services might also. be
special. The paper by Arthur Rolnick and Warren
Weberofthe Federal Reserve BankofMinneapolis,
entitled "Explaining the Demand for Free Bank
Notes," deals withthis issue by examining a histor-
ical period during which banks were allowed to
issue currency. (WarrenWeberpresented thepaper.)
This subject is at the heart ofan understanding of
thenature ofmoney and the demandfor noninterest-
bearing and possibly risky, privately issued money.
It also bears on whether bank regulation is neces-
sary to ensure the provision of a stable medium of
exchange.
The paper presented at the Conference is one ofa
series by Rolnick and Weber (1983,1984) that re-
examines the "free banking" era from 1837 to
1863, during which banks were permitted to issue
their own banknotes (that is, currency). In these
papers, they challenge the traditional view of the
free banking era that characterized the era as cha-
otic, with widespread fraudulent "wildcat" bank-
ing, large numbers ofbank failures, large losses to
banknoteholders, and frequent bankingpanics. The
experiences of that era are often cited as evidence
that strong government regulation of banking is
necessary for banking and monetary stability, and
thatbanks should not be allowed to issue their own
banknotes.
The specific question addressed in the conference
paper is why privately issued, risky banknotes were
demanded as a mediumofexchange when relatively
safe specie (gold and silver coins) were available.5
Rolnick and Weber have two answers to this ques-
tion. First, banknotes issued in the states of New
York, Wisconsin and Indiana were in fact not very
risky because their backing (the assets banks
acquired by issuing banknotes) was sufficiently
strong. Althoughbanknotesapparently circulatedat
par in these states, as did specie, the service return
on banknotes may well have equalled that ofspecie
even though some banks failed to payoffbanlalotes
at par (although the losses were very small). The
reason for comparable service returns was that wear
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onthe coins imposed costs on the.use ofspecie that
approximatedtheexpected losses onbanknotesdue
tobarlk failures.· Moreover, banknotes may have
been more convenient than coin for large transac-
tionS.
Second, in Minnesota,. where.banknotes of the
"railroad" banks eventually·were redeemed·at far
below par because their backing was very poor,
banknotes•appear to have been exchanged at well
below par and treated as small-denomination
securities, not par-valued money_ Rolnick and
Weber point out that the notion that freebanknotes
were priced as risky securities rather than as safe
currency implies that the public was able to judge
the quality of the underlying assets. This view is
much different from the conventional one that the
public accepted banknotes at par regardless of the
quality ofthebank's assets presumablybecause they
were either naive or misinformed.
Ifthe acceptance of banknotes below par were
characteristic ofotherstates during the free banking
era, the traditional literature may have misin-
terpreted the trueeconomic function ofsome banks.
According to Rolnick and Weber, banks may have
acted more like mutual funds offeringdenomination
intermediation than issuers of a par-value medium
ofexchange.
Comments by Tom Cargill
Oneunresolvedbutvery importantquestion men-
tionedbyTomCargilloftheUniversityofNevada'at
Reno in hisdiscussion ofRolnick andWeber's paper
is whether nonpar-valued banknotes such as those
issued by the railroad banks actually circulated as a
medium of exchange. If not, Cargill questioned
whether silver and gold coins were used more than
banknotes in Minnesota than in the other states.
If nonpar-valued banknotes did circulate as a
medium ofexchange, Cargill stated that a banking
system in which bank deposits are equity shares (as
are money marketmutual fund shares) may be more
feasible than is· normally thought possible. This
conclusion is important because such a banking
system is not subject to runs and it may be that
banking has developed along a different line
because ofunnecessary restrictions. Ifso, one ave-
nue to solving the bankrunproblemwhileeliminat-
ing .the deposit insurance guarantee would be toallow (or perhaps require) banks to offer equity
share deposits rather than par-valued deposits.
Cargill also raised the question of why Min-
nesota's. experiences differed from those of New
York, Indiana, and Wisconsin even though the
ostensible regulatory environments were the same.
Forexample, he asked whether the railroad banks in
Minnesotawereexplicitlytolerated by stateofficials
or the result ofclever exploitations ofloopholes by
bankers?
Indiscussing the paper, Cargill also pointedout a
limitation of the paper's applicability to current
problems. He noted that banks during the free
banking era operated in a commodity-based mone-
tary system (gold was the numeraire) in which there
would have been much less reason for concern with
banks' issuance of currency than in our current
system where currency itself is the numeraire.
Cargill applauded the authors for dispelling a
number of common myths about the free banking
era. He stressed that the paper's importance goes far
beyond that of an interesting piece of historical
research. In particular, he cited the paper's impor-
tant implications for the rationalization of govern-
ment regulation offinancial institutionsas well as its
implications for the type of regulations that might
enhance financial efficiency.
Perhaps most importantly, Cargill believed the
paper debunks the idea that restrictive government
regulation is necessary because the public cannot
distinguish between good and bad banks. (The
traditional argument is that such regulation is
needed because the banking system would be
destabilized by the contagion of bank runs if the
public were unable to distinguish good from bad
banks.)
The Intermediation Profit Margin and
Market Share of S&Ls
by Alan Hess
Alan Hess ofthe UniversityofWashington, in his
paper entitled "The Intermediation Profit Margin
and Market Share of Savings and Loan Associa-
tions," deals with the question of just what eco-
nomic functions savings and loan associations
(S&Ls) provide. He addresses two interrelated
aspects ofthe question: (1) could S&Ls have earned
a positive profit margin in the periodfrom the 1950s
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to the 1980s ifthey hadhedged their portfolios and
thus provided only intermediation services, and (2)
is there something special about S&L deposits that
clluses households to continue to hold relatively
stlll>Ieatnounts ofthem even in the face ofrelatively
large cha.n.ges in the differential between the rate
paid on such deposits and the rate on substitute
assets?
'fheanswers to these questions have several
potentially important public policy implications.
First, ifS&Lscanearn a pure intermediation profit
distinct from aprofit resulting from assuming inter-
est-rate risk, they must be providing a valuable
economic function that somehow differs from the
similar function performed by primary financial
markets (for example, securities markets).
Second, if thrifts' economic functions are some-
how special, part ofthe reason might be that thrifts'
or other depositories' deposit-taking and loan orig-
ination services differ from similar functions
provided by primary financial markets. Thus, like
Chris James' paper, whichdeals with the question of
whether bank loans are special, Hess' paper deals
with the issue of whether the financial intermedia-
tion process is special.
Hess finds that the S&L intermediation profit
margin has been positive since 1950 and has
exhibited a strong upward trend since its trough in
1965. This intermediation profit margin contrasts
with the actual profit margin of thrifts, which
declined sharply and even became negative when
interest rates rose in the early 1980s. Thus, Hess
argues that had thrifts eliminated their duration
imbalance, the sharp rise in interest rates in the early
1980s would not have caused so many of them to
fail.
In a statistical analysis of the intermediation
profit margin, Hess finds that both trend growth and
deviations from trend growth are due mainly to the
difference between the rate on one-year U.S. gov-
ernmentsecurities and theaveragerate paidon S&L
deposits. The differential increases whenever open
marketrates rise, thus increasing thrifts' intermedia-
tionprofit margin.
'fhese findings lead Hess to ask whether S&Ls
lose market share to substitute assets when the rate
differential and hence their intermediation profit
margin increases. If such an effect were largeenough, aggregate industry income could actually
fall when the intermediationprofit marginincreased
because the sizeofthe S&Lindustry woulddecline.
Such a result would suggestthat S&Ldeposits have
anumberofclosesubstitutesandthatthey arenotin
any sense special.
In fact, Hess's results are quite the opposite. He
finds that the substitutability ofS&L deposits with
other assets is very small, andinterprets this finding
as evidence that the S&Ls reduce information and!
ortransactions coststodepositors. Thisreductionin
information costs, intum, reduces depositors' port-
folio substitution in response to interest rate dif-
ferentials. Thus, when market interest rates rise
relative to S&L deposit rates, the intermediation
profit margin increases on a one-to-one basis while
S&L's marketshares fall only slightly. Theneteffect
ofthese two forces on the aggregate industry inter-
mediation profit margin is to increase industry
profits when interest rates rise - a pattern opposite
thatobservedwhenS&Lsdonothedgetheirinterest
rate risk.
Comments by Herb Kaufman
Herb Kaufman of Arizona State University dis-
cussed the paper. He wondered if the estimated
interest elasticities of demand for deposits were
sensitive to the estimationprocedure, arguing that a
multi-equation approach might produce different
estimates.
Kaufman then discussed three other points: (l)
the optimal number of thrift institutions, (2) their
ability to immunize their portfolios, and (3) the
underpricing ofFSLIC insurance.
Kaufman agreed with Hess's point that fewer
S&Ls would have failed if they had been able to
immunize themselves from interest rate risk in the
early 1980s. But he suggested that the optimal
number of thrifts might have declined in the early
1980s due to changes in the economy, andthat, as a
result, some thrifts would have failed anyway. For
example, he pointed outthat some banks failed even
though they were more or less immunized against
interest rate risk.
Kaufman also noted that, until recently, market
instruments were inadequate for thrifts to immunize
themselves against interest rate risk. Instruments
that hedge againstinterestrate risk, such as futures,
43
adjustable rate mortgages, and securitized mort-
gage pools, are all relatively recent developments.
Even now, with these instruments available, some
thrifts choose not to use them to immunize them-
selvesagainstinterestrate risk. One.reason for their
choicemight be.the underpricing ofFSLIC deposit
insurance, which provides an incentive for thrifts to




by Ben Bernanke andMark Gertler
Thefinal paperbyBenBernankeofPrincetonand
Mark Gertler of the University of Wisconsin,
entitled "Agency Cost, Collateral and Business
Fluctuations," provides a theoreticalexplanationof
the microeconomic foundations ofbanking and the
connection between banking and the macroecon-
omy. (The paper was presented by Ben Bernanke.)
The paperfocuses on special aspects ofbank credit
and thus is related to Chris James' paperon whether
bank credit is special.
Bernanke and Gertler's paper has important
implications for public policy since it highlights the
interrelationships between the bank intermediation
process and the real economy. In fact, Bernanke
argues in another related paper (Bernanke, 1983)
that the collapse of bank-provided intermediation
services was a major contributing factor to the
length and severity of the Great Depression. The
results· of the Conference paper also suggest that
financial problems can have important effects at the
macro level.
The two economists' analysis starts at the micro
level with assumptions about informational struc-
tures regarding the outcome ofinvestment projects,
and shows that the "institutions" ofdebt and bank-
ruptcy will·arise. Bernanke and Gertler then show
how a financial structure with both debt and bank-
ruptcy leads to a connection between the financial
and real parts ofthe economy.
Theirpaperis divided into two basic parts. In the
first part, the authors provide a static partial equi-
libriumanalysisofthe financing ofphysical invest-
ments. In this analysis, investments are of such a
large size that no single individual has sufficient
resources to finance them. As a result, investmentsare typically financed by both "inside" and "out-
side" funds- that is, equity and debt. This method
of financing leads to a standard agency problem
withdivergent incentives between borrowers (firms)
and Jenders«debt holders). The key proposition
Bernanke and Gertler establish is that the more
collateral (equity) that the borrowers or insiders
bring to a project, the lowerare the agency costs and
the more efficient will be the investment process.
The authors show that the existence of asym-
metric information (the insider-equity holders have
more information about the project's outcome than
the outsider-lenders) leads to an optimalcontractfor
outside financing that takes the form of a debt
contract. A debt contract is one in which the insider
announces the return to the project, say x. If the
actual return were greater than or equal to x, the
outsider would receive x, and if the actual return
were less than x, the firm would go bankruptand the
outsider would receive all the remaining assets.
According to Bernanke and Gertler, there is a
social loss or agency cost associated with bank-
ruptcy because the lenders must audit a bankrupt
firm to ensure that they receive all ofthe remaining
assets of the firm. Bringing more collateral to the
projectlowers agency costs becausethe morecollat-
eral the insider brings to theproject, ceteris paribus,
the lower the probability of bankruptcy and the
lower the expected auditing cost.
An implication of this analysis is that there is a
connection between the financial arrangements in
the economy and the real investment undertaken.
Forexample, ina world in which there is a greatdeal
ofbankruptcy anddefault, the efficiencyofphysical
investment will be lower.
Inthe secondpartofthe paper, the authors embed
their micro financial model into a macro model to
examine its business cycle implications. In this
macro model, output is in the demand-for-invest-
ment .function because, according to the model,
when firms do well and output is high, collateral
also is high and high collateral lowers the cost of
borrowing. Thus, as real income rises, saving
increases but investment demand also increases
because ofthe "financial-solvency" effect. Income
therefore has to increase more to balance the
demand for investment with savings.
44
The. integration of a financial sector into the
macro model leads to a more "persistent" business
cycle with greater amplitudes. The intuition behind
this resultis thatifproductivity rises, for example,
borrowerswilLbecome more solvent since they will
h/:lvemore collateral, and therefore agency costs
will be lower and investment demand would be
stimulated (due to lower borrowing costs). More-
over,. since .more investment occurs, the effects
persistovertime. (The story works in a similar way
ina.recessionwhen collateral declines, borrowing
costs increase, and investment decreases.)
A final point of Bernanke and Gertler's paper is
that·financial shocks themselves can be causes of
business cycles. For example, a large unanticipated
deflation would redistribute wealth away from bor-
rowers to lenders, given that debt contracts are
written in nominal terms. This wealth redistribution
lowers collateral and makes the borrowing class less
creditworthy, which in tum reduces the amount of
financial intermediation and physical investment.
This unanticipated deflation can have an adverse
effect on real output.
One major limitation of the paper noted by Ber-
nanke is that the model applies best to privately held
firms. Iffirms could easily issue additional equity,
for example, they would have no need for debt
financing and the conclusions of the paper would
nothold. Bernanke suggested one answer to this
criticism is that there may be similaragency costs in
publicly held firms, costs that preclude them from
using equity issuance as a means of raising new
funds.
Bernanke and Gertler's paper has potentially far-
reaching policy implications. For one, it suggests
that ..to the extent public policy can enhance the
stability ofthe financial system, the real economy
wilIbenefit. It also suggests that unanticipated
deflations caused, for example, by contractionary
m9netl:lfY policy, can have an adverse effect on the
re.al ~conomy.
comments by Aris Protopapadakis
Aris Protopapadakis of the Claremont Graduate
School,.in his discussion of the paper, praised the
paperas excellent and urged the authors to continue
their.research. He did suggest that the authorsconsideradding risk-aversion to the model sincethe
structure of the model precludes initially identical
persons from holding identical portfolios (some
persons hold debt while others hold equity).
Protopapadakisthoughtthe main weakness ofthe
paper, which was acknowledged in the paper's con-
clusion, is that it is somewhat hard to see how its
FOOTNOTES
1. See Tom Sargent, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco Economic Review, Fall 1986.
2. The role of multiperiod wage contracts for the effective-
ness of monetary policy is studied by Fischer [1977],
Taylor [1980], and the conference paper by Taylor dis-
cussed below.
3. See, for example, Taylor (1980).
4. Although James does not focus on this explanation, it
may be that banks obtain inside information about firms
through their deposit relationships. If so, the special nature
of bank loans cannot be separated from the special nature
of deposits.
(5. Although Rolnick and Weber provide an interesting
explanation of why there was a demand for banknotes,
there also are interesting questions regarding what factors
limited their supply. For example, if (noninterest-bearing)
banknotes could be used to buy (interest-bearing) state
bonds (which could be deposited in turn for more bank-
notes) as the authors argue, seemingly a bank owner
would buy an unlimited amount of bonds, thus infinitely
leveraging original capital and earning an unlimited profit.
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findings apply to publicly held corporations.
Although he thought that some of the elements of
the papermight apply, he questioned whether it was
possible to show that stock contracts as well as debt
contracts would arise as a means of attracting out-
side funds.
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